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Peace agreements often include provisions for group-based representation in the police and military. Why would a politically-dominant group risk including former opponents in these armed institutions? I argue that visible participation in the security forces solves a commitment problem between a weaker rebel group and the politically-dominant. Rebels depend on external actors to impose sanctions on their opponent, provide security force assistance, and confer international recognition, and on the domestic population to contribute fighters and cover. Visible participation in security forces undermines claims of marginalization, makes a group less likely to attract support, and therefore makes rebellion more difficult. Dominant group civilians exposed to minority participation in the state security forces should therefore interpret it as a credible signal that the participating group does not intend to rebel, making them more willing to make concessions in peace negotiations. I test this argument using data from Israel on the religious makeup of police officers at every station in the country over a six-year period, along with survey data on the attitudes of the Jewish majority towards the Arab minority and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. I find that Jewish citizens exposed to more Arab police officers are less likely to believe that Arabs seek to destroy Israel and its Jewish population, and more willing to make concessions in the peace process.