Agents or Advisors: Domestic Institutional Design and the Politics of Protection

• In Event: Bureaucracies and Foreign Policy

Abstract

How does the structure of foreign policy decision-making shape economic liberalization? While research in IR considers the effects of domestic institutions on liberalization, this research has largely focused on regime type explanations. Yet, even within democratic regimes, electoral mechanisms connected to the importance of democracy also rely on transmission through bureaucracies that implement and regulate policies. This paper introduces a theory of bureaucratic politics that underlines how variation in bureaucratic structure shapes economic liberalization outcomes. I argue that bureaucratic structures that facilitate industry groups input into trade policy are less resilient to protectionist pressures from industry. Evidence from an original dataset covering 135 countries over a period of over 20 years provides support for this theory. I operationalize bureaucratic structure by creating a measure that quantifies the types and number of institutions among which countries split their trade policy portfolio. This is a structural measure that allows meaningful cross-national and temporal comparison. I show that bureaucratic structures with a larger concentration of agencies, as opposed to ministries and advisory groups, decrease the probability countries will employ temporary trade barriers (TTBs).

Author

• Diana Stanescu, Princeton University