Bureaucratic Reactions to Global Performance Assessments

• In Event: Bureaucracies and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Global Performance Assessments (GPAs), which evaluate states and subnational units, have proliferated. These indicators vary dramatically in their effectiveness at changing state behavior. While scholars have recently considered cross-national and cross-indicator variation in effectiveness, another source of variation remains underexplored: variation between bureaucracies. In this paper, I find that domestic bureaucratic structure shapes the ability of global indicators to change state behavior. This is because collective action problems between bureaucracies can decrease willingness to take the lead in changing policy. First, I find that bureaucracies that are central to the policy process are more likely to respond to GPAs than more peripheral bureaucracies. Second, I find that states with a more fragmented bureaucratic structure are more resistant to change. I test these hypotheses using a bureaucracy-level rating system on foreign aid effectiveness. Because bureaucracies are often the units with the most in-depth policy-making power, scholars would be well served to consider bureaucratic variation in understanding how policy change comes about.

Author

• Shannon Carcelli, University of Maryland, College Park