Blue Cities vs. Red States? Evidence on the Fluctuation of State Preemption Laws

• In Event: Policy in US States and Localities

Abstract

Previous research on Federalism highlights the coercive nature of the relationship between levels of government. One branch of this literature has focused on studying how states control cities through the use of preemption laws, a type of law that reduces the regulatory and policy power of local governments. But when do states pass these laws? This question is central to understanding how the balance of power in the American federalist system functions. Previous work argues that preemption laws are used by conservative states seeking to restrain liberal cities. I challenge this argument by showing that preemption laws are passed by state legislators on both sides of the ideological spectrum. I specifically collect a novel dataset on preemption laws, something that was missing from the scholarship on the subject. I also examine the political, geographical and institutional contexts under which these laws arise by using case studies in five states of the US. I find that preemption laws are passed by state legislators often in an attempt to gain political or partisan power, but also simply to establish uniform legislations within state jurisdictions. This paper provides a novel and detailed dataset on preemption laws; illustrates a consequence of partisan polarization and sheds light into the larger debate on Federalism.

Author

• Luisa Godinez Puig, Boston University