Rationalist Explanations for Costly Conflict

• In Event: International Economics and War

Abstract

I generalize the bargaining theory of war to yield a framework for explaining virtually all costly behavior in international politics, including the imposition of economic sanctions, the building of arms, the seeking of allies, the waging of proxy conflicts, and the exaction of tribute. Like war, each of these other modes of costly conflict derives from the presence of asymmetric information or commitment problems. Each mode can be a substitute for or complement to other modes. A given mode should occur only when it is as cost-effective a response to the underlying bargaining problem as any other mode. This implies that various “new” rationalist explanations for war suggested in recent work can instead be interpreted as new manifestations of either asymmetric information or commitment problems. It also suggests a fundamentally different approach to the empirical study of the causes of war—and sanctions, and arms races, and the rest.

Author

• Andrew J. Coe, Vanderbilt University