Electoral Incentives and Violence against Refugees

• In Event: Refugee Crises, Policies, and Violence against Refugees

Abstract

Research on the security consequences of forced migration tends to focus on how refugee flows contribute to the diffusion of violence across borders. However, new evidence shows that there is more violence perpetrated against refugees than violence perpetrated by refugees against host states. This paper identifies when host states are more likely to violate the physical integrity of their refugee populations. We argue that violence against refugees tends to increase during election periods, as leaders act on incentives to foster xenophobia and construct more exclusive notions of group identity to boost their own prospects at the polls. In addition, refugees without electoral power are strategically attractive targets of violence for leaders who aim to deflect criticism and maintain power. We provide a multi-pronged approach to test our conjecture, supplementing a large-N cross-sectional analysis using new data on violence against refugees with sub-national geo-spatial analysis of elections and violence in sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2000 to 2010. The findings provide evidence for our expectations and have important implications for the international community’s current delegation of refugee protection to host governments.

Authors

• Kerstin Fisk, Loyola Marymount University

• Burcu Savun, University of Pittsburgh