Elections without Competition: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation

• In Event: Formal Models of Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

Elections in authoritarian regimes can serve as institutional tools that enable leaders to ³divide and conquer² their opponents. In this paper, we propose a specific channel through which autocratic incumbents can coopt their opponents. We argue that such incumbents strategically rotate ministerial appointments before elections to signal the likelihood that they will subsequently invite opposition politicians into government. Through a formal model, we show that this dynamic induces opposition forces to fracture, as opposition politicians prefer to compete for office independently rather than coalescing through established parties, given the possibility of a cabinet position. Employing original data on ministerial cabinets in 36 African countries, we show that a greater rate of pre-electoral cabinet reshuffling is associated with a larger number of opposition candidates in presidential and legislative elections. Our findings suggest that autocratic incumbents can weaken long-term opposition forces through patronage even in the absence of outright electoral fraud.

Authors

• Leonardo R. Arriola, University of California, Berkeley

• Anne Meng, University of Virginia