Authoritarian Backsliding

• In Event: Formal Models of Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

A prominent contemporary phenomenon is an apparent “backsliding” of democratic countries into (semi-)authoritarian practices. Importantly, such episodes unfold over time, and often involve uncertainty about the ultimate intentions of governments. Governments typically do not attempt to engage in authoritarian practices immediately, but rather initiate policies or institutional reforms that may in the future facilitate or enable actions that are inconsistent with liberal democratic practices. Building on recent work (Svolik 2017), we develop a formal model that explores both features (and their interaction) in a two-period game in which a government takes an action in period 1 that may allow for subsequent actions that are inconsistent with the rule of law in period 2. Citizens face uncertainty over the ultimate intentions of the government, and must decide whether to replace the first-period government before period 2. The model generates several insights. First, consistent with other work (e.g., Svolik 2018), it suggests that polarization among citizens and elites is an important factor in driving authoritarian backsliding. Extending this logic, the model demonstrates that the degree of polarization necessary to generate the potential for backsliding depends critically on the uncertainty facing citizens about the type of incumbent. Finally, in such a setting, citizens may support incumbent governments even if there is some risk that these governments are “closet autocrats” despite the fact that citizens are fundamentally opposed to authoritarianism. One consequence is that in our model, citizens may genuinely come to regret their electoral choices—a marked contrast from models in which citizens accept authoritarian outcomes because on balance these are preferable to the alternative. We illustrate the model’s implications through an analytic narrative that focuses on the current Polish government’s efforts to reform the Polish judiciary.

Authors

• Georg Vanberg, Duke University

• Monika Nalepa, University of Chicago

• Caterina Chiopris, Harvard University