The Organizational Dynamics of Military-Militant Alliances

• In Event: Alliances and War

Abstract

Over the past three decades, governments and foreign militant groups have, on average, engaged in more intense forms of military cooperation– such as forming joint commands, conducting joint attacks, and providing military aid – than state-state dyads. Governments and foreign militants also frequently exchange intelligence, logistical support, and economic aid, among others. What explains the variation in types of support government-militant partners provide each other? I argue that, when partners' armed forces have similar standard operating procedures and chains of command, they provide each other more intense forms of support, like conducting joint operations. Militant and government forces that share these characteristics mutually understand how the other acts in different contexts, reducing uncertainty about each other’s future behavior. To assess my theory, I conduct case studies on U.S. support of Syrian rebel coalitions, U.S. partnerships with Iraqi tribal militias, and Hezbollah’s support of Syrian and Russian Armed Forces, drawing on 60+ interviews with Syrian militants and U.S. and Jordanian officials. I also leverage a novel cross-national dataset of all dyadic provisions of support in conflicts between 1975-2015. By applying an organizational framework to government-militant partnerships, I present a new level of analysis that provides unparalleled analytic leverage in explaining inter-organizational cooperation.

Author

• Melissa Anne Carlson, University of California, Berkeley