The Representational Consequences of Redistricting Reform

• In Event: Redistricting Reform and Impact in the US

Abstract

In recent years, many state governments have adopted or have at least considered redistricting reforms. In 2018, for example, citizens in five states voted to adopt independent redistricting commissions, while a number of states have amended their constitutions to include district compactness and “free and fair election” clauses, as well as multi-member districting in an effort to limit partisan influence over election administration. Yet relatively little scholarship has investigated the representational impact of these reforms in a systematic way. As the debate over redistricting reform intensifies, we seek to provide clarity for reformers hoping to level the political playing field through redistricting reforms. We leverage our comprehensive dataset of the pre- and post-2011 redistricting plans for enacted for 95 state legislative chambers in order to illuminate the links between districting institutions and their outcomes. We focus on four specific reforms: independent commissions; constitutional compactness requirements; multi-member districts; and “free and fair elections” clauses. Our preliminary findings suggest that independent commissions and multi-member districts neutralize political asymmetries in districting plans, while compactness requirements do not impact partisan bias in any measurable way. And we find mixed results in our analysis of “free and fair elections” clauses. Our findings inform the debate over redistricting reform and suggest that even modest reforms, such as implementing multi-member districts, can reduce partisan bias in districting.

Authors

• Alex Keena, Virginia Commonwealth University

• Michael Latner, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

• Anthony J. McGann, University of Strathclyde

• Charles Smith, University of California, Irvine