Globalization, Polarized Workplace Politics & Electoral Linkages in France

• In Event: Interests Representation and Distribution in Latin America & Non-Western Europe

Abstract

This paper draws on data from France, in which both trade exposure and political polarization have grown substantially over the past thirty years, to analyze the extent to which global trade exposure shapes patterns of political behavior within the workplace and its connection to broader patterns of electoral polarization. There is now compelling empirical evidence suggesting that trade with low-wage economies has substantial distributional and political consequences within the wealthy industrialized countries. Several papers report that districts harder hit by trade from China and Eastern Europe are more likely to elect extreme-right, but not extreme-left, parties (Autor et al 2016; Dippel, Gold, Heblich 2016). Our paper builds on extant work on the relationship between local labor market shocks and political polarization but extends it to political developments within the workplace (the choices made by workers and employers in firm-level works council and labor tribunal elections), and assesses how this mediates broader patterns of electoral support for radical political formations.
We use France as a case to gain insight into questions of how trade exposure influences firm-level political behavior. France provides an excellent lens through which to study the dynamics of political polarization among our two populations of interest: workers and legislators. First, French workers participate in regular elections for representatives to works councils (comités d’entreprise, délégués du personnel) and to Labour Courts (conseillers prud'homaux). Theoretically, when it comes to the decision about which trade union to support, one can imagine two potential responses among workers in areas being hit by import competition. On the one hand, affected workers might be attracted to radical trade unions calling for increased protectionism and a hard-line position. On the other hand, facing the possibility of job losses, it seems equally plausible that affected workers might be willing to support reformist trade unions who are more willing to engage in concessionary wage bargaining with employers. We are also interested in assessing whether polarization effects are limited to workers in industries directly affected by import competition, or whether there is generalized spillover to workers in other industries. By linking local level data on trade exposure to firm-level election returns to cantonal-level results for national elections, we hope to gain traction on how labor market and electoral politics are influenced by economic pressures from global economic competition.

Authors

• Sara Watson, Ohio State University

• Mark I. Vail, Tulane University