Fairness Perceptions, Governance, and Democratic Satisfaction in Latin America

• In Event: Segregation, Corruption, and Hidden Wealth

Abstract

How do individuals’ judgments about inequality and fairness affect support for the political system? Prior research has shown that economic inequality undermines political engagement (Holzner, 2010; Solt, 2008), creates inequalities in political representation (Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012), and erodes support for democratic governments more generally (Anderson & Singer, 2008; Krieckhaus et al., 2014). I build on this research by arguing that when citizens perceive high levels of distributive unfairness in society, they will be less satisfied with the way their democracy functions. Yet, good governance – i.e., impartiality in the exercise of political authority – should ameliorate the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on democratic satisfaction. To test my arguments, I rely on a two-pronged research strategy. First, I use a cross-national analysis of 18 Latin American countries – a region with the highest level of inequality in the world – to demonstrate individuals are significantly less satisfied with democracy when they perceive their country’s income distribution as unfair. Yet, good governance – as indicated by a country’s level of corruption – significantly offsets this negative relationship. I next use a series of survey experiments from Argentina and Mexico to isolate the causal mechanisms suggested by my cross-national analysis. Although the governance indicator used in my cross-national analysis is based on a broad measure of corruption, prior research has demonstrated that not all forms of corruption impact citizens’ political evaluations in the same manner (e.g. Bauhr, 2017). Thus, I investigate how two important corruption indicators – bribery and theft of public resources – moderate the relationship between distributive unfairness (inequality) and satisfaction with democracy. The finding from these analyses imply that policymakers can bolster democratic satisfaction, even in places where citizens perceive the income distribution as fundamentally unfair, by committing to good governance and fair democratic procedures.


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Bauhr, M. (2017). Need or Greed? Conditions for Collective Action Against Corruption. Governance, 30(4), 561-581.

Holzner, C.A. (2010). Poverty of Democracy: The institutional roots of political participation in Mexico. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Krieckhaus, J., Son, B., Bellinger, N.M., & Wells, J.M. (2014). Economic Inequality and Democratic Support. Journal of Politics, 76(1), 139-151.

Solt, F. (2008). Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 48-6.

Author

• Gregory Saxton, Texas Tech University