Political Outsiders and Democratic Backsliding

• In Event: Democratic Backsliding and Authoritarian Control

Abstract

What explains the rise of political outsiders to high office? And what are the implications of such leaders for the continuation of democratic rule? In this paper, we argue that, under democratic rule, out- siders are most likely to rise to high office when political parties rely on electoral strategies emphasizing candidate charisma, rather than emphasizing coherent party brands. Parties adopt charisma focused strategies when short-term electoral considerations are prioritized over long-term success – a situation most likely to arise in contexts characterized either by ideological polarization or electoral volatility. This reliance on the charismatic appeal of individual politicians renders political parties more dependent on their leaders, and so less able to check authoritarian backsliding, than when campaigns center on party-centric appeals. Outsiders are thus associated with backsliding and even autocratic reversion. In what follows, we formalize these intuitions. We then test (1) whether polarization and volatility are associated with outsider chief executives in democratic states; (2) whether outsider leaders are asso- ciated with democratic backsliding; and (3) explore the relationship between polarization and volatility, the rise of outsider leaders, and democratic backsliding, where political outsiders are defined as chief executives without prior experience in elected office.

Authors

• James R. Hollyer, University of Minnesota

• Marko Klasnja, Georgetown University

• Rocio Titiunik, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor