Come Home, Neorealists! Why the International System Explains US Interventions

• In Event: Explaining US Intervention and Restraint after the Cold War

Abstract

Seasoned neorealists have begun turning to US politics to explain the Iraq War and other post-Cold War interventions. But abandoning system-level explanation in favor of domestic accounts would be unwarranted and potentially counterproductive. Victory over the Soviet Union did not insulate the United States from the pressures of interstate competition under anarchy. Further, the end of bipolarity did not grant domestic actors and pressure groups outsized influence over US behavior. On the contrary, variance between US aggression and restraint continued to conform to the structures of the anarchic international system.

After November 1989, the United States acted to project unipolarity as far into the future as possible. This involved maximizing US advantage over declining (Russia) and rising (China) peer competitors. Maintaining a US-dominant status quo also entailed revisionist tactics. The United States enlarged its alliances and military networks through consent where possible, through force where necessary. In this way, Washington deprived its competitors of access to high-value resources and clients. Consistent with this logic, the United States attacked states that exhibit material value and militarily vulnerability.

Empirical evidence comes from comparison across thirty potential targets of interventions and process tracing in a contrasting pair of historical cases: Iraq and Iran. Overall, the explanation based on interstate competition and selective revisionism does a better job than domestic-level arguments at explaining US combat intervention where they have occurred (Kosovo, Iraq, Libya), as well as the much longer list of minor powers the United States instead treated with engagement (Iran, North Korea…) or indifference (Rwanda, Sudan…).

Author

• Jason Brownlee, University of Texas, Austin