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Recent research provides strong evidence that targeted government transfers increase private access to basic utilities in developing democracies. However, the existing literature does not analyze the feedback effects of increased private access to basic utilities on local government responsiveness. What is the relationship between targeted government transfers, private access to basic utilities, and public access to basic utilities? In other words, how do local government officials respond when unconnected households—households that do not have public or private access to basic utilities—obtain new access to basic utilities through private connections?
In this paper, I introduce a new theoretical argument on the consequences of targeted government transfers for local government responsiveness in developing democracies. Using a randomized field experiment in Mexico, I employ linear regression models to estimate the effects of targeted government transfers on public access to multiple basic utilities. The results indicate that targeted cash transfers have no effect on public access to basic utilities in the short term, but that the transfers reduce access to public services in the long term. These findings strongly suggest that targeted government transfers, via increased private access to basic utilities in the short term, discourage local government officials from expanding public service systems in the long term. The results support my argument and have important implications for literature on social policies in developing countries, policy feedback, and government accountability.
My paper addresses the annual meeting’s theme of “Populism and Privilege” in two main ways. First, the paper considers the increase of basic utility coverage among disadvantaged citizens, as access to basic utilities expands beyond privileged elites. Second, the paper analyzes the mechanism that produces the expansion in utility coverage, focusing on the demands of disadvantaged citizens and the corresponding pressures on local government officials.