Compulsory Voting and "Random" Votes: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

• In Event: Electoral Rule Reforms and Mistakes

Abstract

Compulsory voting is known for boosting electoral turnout, even when sanctions for abstaining are small or loosely enforced. Much less is known, however, about the consequences of compulsory voting on vote choice, and, in particular, about the quality of electoral decisions. In this paper, we explore the extent to which voters meaningfully engage in the electoral process or simply vote "randomly" (i.e., vote for any candidate whatsoever) because voting is required by law. We adopt a list experiment from a large online survey conducted in Brazil during the 2018 national elections to assess if voters engage in "random" voting. We evaluate random voting for different types of elected offices (state and federal legislators, governor, and president)—some of which are presumably viewed by voters as more important than others—and evaluate the determinants of "random" voting. Preliminary findings indicate that : 1) there is substantial "random" voting under compulsory voting; 2) the extent to which voters engage in "random" voting varies by elected office; and, 3) interest in politics and political knowledge both appear to reduce "random" voting". Our findings carry important implications for the study of citizen participation and competence under compulsory voting and democratic representation, more broadly.

Authors

• Alessandro de Oliveira Gouveia Freire

• Mathieu Turgeon, The University of Western Ontario