Bribes, Bullets and Borders? Why States Allow Illicit Small Arms Trafficking

• In Event: The Politics of Confronting Criminal Violence

Abstract

Though transnational illicit markets (IMs) can generate serious spillover costs across their trafficking routes, governments do not always confront IMs. Not only must a government expend scarce resources to combat illicit trafficking at home, but a crackdown might create or intensify costly spillovers such as violence. The domestic incentives to tolerate or excise IMs have a rippling effect within regions because traffickers likely move illicit goods through less-constrained routes and, in extreme cases, across regions as intense violence sometimes leads to increased migration and other secondary spillovers.

Under what conditions do governments allow IMs within and across their borders? While we might expect most states to crack down on violent IMs within their borders, I show that the choice to counter IMs is highly constrained by a domestic government’s incentives to protect or at least tolerate them. I argue that the distribution of spillover costs and government access to illicit gains explain these decisions: a state only seeks to reign in an IM when concentrated costs on core supporters outweigh the government’s expected illicit gains. International pressure only influences state governance of IMs when domestic constraints are nonbinding.

I test this argument through case studies focused on state governance of illicit small arms and light weapons by evaluating 1.) post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia through a most-similar case design and 2.) Jamaica and Grenada through a most-different case design. To consider domestic considerations for cracking down on illicit small arms trafficking, I assess original evidence from elite-level interviews and subnational data on trends in political support, illicit small arms seizures, and spillover costs such as gun violence. This paper contributes to the intersection of conflict studies and IPE by investigating the variation in state governance of IMs. As states and intergovernmental organizations attempt to manage the repercussions of illicit small arms trafficking, we need a clearer understanding of the conditions under which governments allow these IMs.

Author

• Lauren E. Pinson, Yale University