Volunteers, Conscripts and Insurgents: The Role of Manpower in Regime Politics

• In Event: Poster Session: Formal Political Theory; Political Methodology & Canadian Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Formal Political Theory: Formal Models of Political Processes

Abstract

How does conscription influence civil conflict? This paper considers the strategic rationale and effects of conscription upon intrastate conflict processes. We argue that because conscription alters the outside option of citizens deciding which party to support during civil conflict, it has thus far unrecognized implications for intrastate conflict. In particular, we explore how conscription influences insurgent recruitment, civil conflict initiation, and conflict duration. Using a selectorate model of regime politics, we derive the preferences of ruling elites over military manpower procurement systems subject to budget and insurgency constraints. The military labor market is modeled as a duopsony between a rebel and a standing army with elastic labor supply. Citizen types are divided by civilian productivity and enfranchisement status. While insurgents have no access to the formal economy, the standing army is financed out of tax revenues and the state's ability to conscript military labor. Optimal levels of conscription are then derived with respect to the level of both the internal and external threat. We illustrate the dynamics of the model with cases of conscription in Syria and Colombia.

Authors

• Nikitas Konstantinidis, IE University

• Henry Pascoe, IE University