Flying to Win? Nuclear Capabilities and Air Power in Crisis Bargaining

• In Event: The Sources of Interstate Signaling Failures

Abstract

Do military demonstrations offer coercive advantages to nuclear states in international crisis bargaining? Using data that disaggregates military demonstrations into air, naval, and land signals during 210 cases of compellence, this paper examines whether such military signals improve the probability of coercive threats when they emanate from nuclear and nonnuclear states. I find that that while nuclear challengers can use air signals effectively to induce target compliance, nonnuclear challengers cannot. This paper also evaluates the mechanisms at play: Can nuclear challengers signal using air power against all opponents or against only nuclear-armed opponents? If the latter, then manipulation of risk might play a bigger role; if the former, perhaps the greater destructive potential is at work. This finding holds important implications for theoretical and policy debates regarding the role of costly signals and nuclear weapons in international bargaining.

Author

• Abigail Post, Anderson University