The Strategic Logic of Foreign-Imposed Democracy

• In Event: Protecting Human Rights and Promoting Democracy: Challenges and Opportunities

Abstract

Liberal democracies have frequently intervened in foreign states to impose new leaders or regimes. Yet, the goals and strategies of these interventions have varied. During some regime changing interventions, liberal democracies have sought to build and support democratic political institutions in the targeted state. In others, democratic interveners have installed new leaders, without seeking to democratize the wider political institutions of the state. This paper develops an argument explaining why liberal democracies such as the United States have sought to impose democracy during some regime changing interventions, but not others. My argument builds from the premise that while imposed authoritarian regimes may be more likely to deliver short-term policy gains, imposed democracies may be more reliable allies over the long term. When a democratic intervener anticipates that potential leadership candidates aligned with its foreign policy goals can win an electoral majority in the targeted state, the net benefits of installing a democracy may outweigh the benefits of installing an authoritarian regime. The paper assesses this argument through a paired case study of two U.S. interventions during the Cold War.

Author

• Jonathan Monten, University College London