Revolutionary Origins, Military Capacity and Regime Durability

• In Event: Military Coups and Autocracies

Abstract

This paper explores the divergent fates of Frelimo in Mozambique (1974- ) and the Derg in Ethiopia (1974-1991). Both were Afro-Marxist autocracies formed in the 1974 that received significant Soviet assistance and faced major insurgencies in the 1970s and 1980s. Why did Frelimo persist in the face of a major foreign backed guerilla movement (Renamo) while the Derg fell to relatively weak and regionalized rebellions that lacked any foreign sponsorship (TPLF/EPLF) This outcome is puzzling when we consider that the Ethiopia had one of the largest armies in Africa and a much longer tradition of stateness than Mozambique. We argue that the different outcomes can be explained by the regimes’ distinct origins. Frelimo was formed out of an anticolonial revolutionary struggle from below that forced the party to create a new army from scratch; while the Derg came to power via a military coup by an existing army. In Mozambique, revolutionary origins generated party-military fusion that eliminated any serious coup threat and allowed the regime to avoid coup proofing strategies that might have weakened military capacity. By contrast in Ethiopia, the military’s autonomy from the ruling party forced the Derg to engage in debilitating coup proofing strategies that weakened capacity and made the regime more vulnerable to insurgency.

Authors

• Steven Levitsky, Harvard University

• Adam Casey, University of Toronto