Changes in Latitude & Attitude: Cooperative Partnering in the Russian Arctic?

• In Event: Russian Political Economy: Arctic, Oil, Welfare and Pension

Abstract

Russia is in the midst of redefining itself as a Euro-Pacific state, its political leadership attempting to reorient its economic and geo-strategic center of gravity further eastward for pragmatic (e.g., European sanctions over Crimea) as well as symbolic reasons. However, while this effort is still at an incipient stage and its success, or even continuity, is by no means assured, it has already raised critical questions about how to interpret and negotiate new economic and strategic realities. But what is often overlooked is that Russia is not only increasingly looking eastward, but also northward.

The acceleration of climate change and new technological advancements are extending the penetration of Russia further into the Arctic than has heretofore been feasible. This advance not only portends considerable economic and military ramifications for the immediate region, but also heralds a potential change in the wider balance of Eurasian power, with Russia looking more and more towards the East Asian states as economic and strategic partners. Indeed, the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UN-CLCS) currently has multiple proposals before it to extend the exclusive zone of national economic interest beyond the current 200 nautical-mile limit based on new mappings of continental shelf morphology; if it rules favorably on these, in the not-too-distant future Russia and Canada (among others) may share an increasingly important northern border.

For the Eurasian side, the viable commercial exploitation of the Northeast Passage (Severnyi morskoi put’) for transshipment of goods between Asian manufacturing centers and developed European markets, along with the ability to finally exploit—due to advancements in drilling technology and a longer open-water season—Arctic oil and gas reserves (according to estimates from the U.S. Geological Survey, this region contains some 13% of the world’s remaining oil and up to 30% of its untapped natural gas reserves) presages a considerable economic windfall. Accompanying it, of course, would be a concomitant change in the military relevance of the region and the arrival of new stakeholders, most prominent among which is China.

This paper employs a comparative political economy approach to examine Russia’s rapidly changing foreign policy towards the Arctic and its bordering states. Specifically considered are the ways in which economic interests in the Arctic are being prioritized by the Kremlin, the intersection between state-led development and partnering with private actors and consortiums, and how these factors relate to wider balance-of-power concerns as the military stakes rise in this region.

Author

• George Soroka, Harvard University