Policy Implementation, Noncompliance, and the Impact of Constitutional Courts

• In Event: The Effectiveness of Oversight in the European Union in Euroskeptic Times

Abstract

Policy-makers depend on government agencies to implement laws, and constitutional courts adjudicate disputes over incorrect implementation. This paper analyzes how the politics of adjudication affect the implementation of policy. Under what conditions do government agencies more closely implement laws, and when do constitutional courts deter incorrect implementation? I model the strategic interaction between an implementing actor, a plaintiff, and a constitutional court over the implementation of a law. In equilibrium, implementing actors make concessions by implementing more complaint policies in order to avoid litigation. I find that constitutional courts are most effective at deterring noncompliance for intermediate levels of preference divergence between policy-makers and implementing actors. I test the key observable implication of the model in the context of the European Union (EU) using a novel dataset of implementation opportunities and noncompliance cases.

Author

• Joshua Camden Fjelstul, Emory University