Cross-Pressured MEPs and the Migrant Crisis in Europe

• In Event: Poster Session: Legislative Studies

Abstract

In this paper I analyze voting behavior in the European Parliament (EP) to answer the following question: what affects the extent to which a member of the European Parliament (MEP) votes with his/her supranational party when that position is in conflict with local or national interests? I address this question by focusing on votes related to the recent migrant crisis. When the national party and the EP party group that an MEP is associated with disagree on an issue, I argue that the extent to which MEPs vote with the EP party group is a function of how salient or controversial the issue is at the local or national level. MEPs will vote against the party group – and with their national party – on local/national issues that are salient and controversial. On votes related to the migrant crisis, I expect MEPs will be more likely to defect from their EP party and vote along the lines of their national party; the extent of defections can be modeled according to the local/national salience of this issue. Because the migrant crisis is an issue that affects each country differently, the salience of the issue is not the same across all MEPs. As a result, public opinion at the mass and elite levels will be vastly different with respect to how the migrant crisis should be handled. I examine this dynamic using roll-call votes related to the migrant crisis and comparing each MEPs vote to that of their national and EP party. I expect that defections will depend on whether the two are aligned and the extent to which the migration crisis affects that MEP’s constituency. This pattern should be especially strong among MEPs affiliated with populist parties. And it should be much stronger on issues like the migrant crisis than other, less salient or controversial, issues.

Author

• Alexa Federice, University at Buffalo