When Do Arab Citizens Use Litigation to Challenge Authoritarian States?

• In Event: Poster Session: Public Administration & Law and Courts
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Law and Courts: Issues in Judicial Politics and Judicial Behavior

Abstract

Under what conditions will individuals use law as a tool for challenging states that operate above the law? In authoritarian countries, particularly those in the Middle East, law is more deferential to state prerogatives than it is protective of citizens’ rights. Nevertheless, Arab citizens use law to pursue a wide variety of grievances against state actors, such as wrongful arrests, revocations of citizenship, the expropriation of land, violations of free speech, and the denial of welfare rights. Scholarship on comparative judicial politics has made important contributions identifying the factors that promote the development of judicial independence under authoritarianism. But if individuals are unwilling to challenge state abuses in the courthouse, even independent courts will fail to effectively regulate and constrain state officials. Leveraging a survey experiment fielded on both the Egyptian public (n=2,028) and Jordanian public (n=1,010) through YouGov, I contend that past instances of judicial activism have lingering effects on the public's willingness to litigate in the present. I find that citizens who know of past court verdicts against state actors are significantly more likely to litigate than those who do not. This finding suggests that institutions aiming to raise public awareness on judicial affairs – civil society groups and the press – can play an important role in mediating citizens willingness to use law as a tool for challenging authoritarian state actors. My results further demonstrate that while perceptions of judicial independence increase litigation among individuals who oppose the current government, judicial independence actually reduces litigation among individuals who support the government. This finding builds upon the comparative judicial politics literature, showing that judicial independence does not uniformly increase the public’s willingness to utilize the courts. Egyptians and Jordanians who support the government would rather litigate in a judiciary that is not independent from that government, whether because: (1) they view pro-government judges as a “friend-of-a-friend,” with shared views and interests; or (2) they believe that government interference in the courts would actually benefit their legal claims. These experimental results are further supported by detailed interviews with Jordanian judges, lawyers, legal activists, litigants, and individuals who chose not to file litigation against state actors (n=52).

Author

• Steven Schaaf, George Washington University