How Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Affects Piracy

• In Event: Dissent, Piracy, and Protests: Water Resources and Violence

Abstract

Fisheries stocks are highly salient resources that can increase risks for intrastate conflict (Hendrix and Glaser 2011), interstate conflict (Nemeth et al 2014), and piracy (Daxecker and Prins 2012). While we have some ideas about the general relationships between fisheries and conflict, we know less about how illegal fishing impacts the violence surrounding fisheries. We argue that opportunity and willingness contribute to the propensity of piracy. Specifically, we suggest that the opportunity for piracy dependents upon the naval capability, economic development, and institutional strength of the state. We also argue that individuals are more willing to engage in piracy when there is rampant illegal fishing, which increase grievances that can motivate the criminal activity. We test this argument using data on IUU (Watson 2017), estimated supply (FAO), and piracy (Daxecker and Prins 2012) and find significant support for both opportunity and willingness causal mechanisms. States’ naval capacity decreases piracy activity while IUU fishing increases the frequency of piracy incidents. The results show that global efforts to curb IUU fishing are very important given the strategic implications for coastal states’ security.

Authors

• Cody Joseph Schmidt, University of Iowa

• Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, University of Iowa