The Identity and Size of Support Coalitions and Autocratic Regime Survival

• In Event: The Comparative Politics of Ideology and Social Support

Abstract

Why do some autocratic regimes endure for decades while others break down after a few years? In addition to considering socio-economic and structural determinants, scholars studying autocratic regime survival, have asked whether institutional- and other features of the regime itself is important for explaining regime longevity. Our point of departure is that prominent theoretical- and case study contributions suggest that the duration of autocratic regimes depends on the size of the regime's support coalition (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 2003) or, alternatively, the identity of the actors making up this coalition. To exemplify the latter, certain social and occupational groups may posit either the economic capacity (e.g., large-scale landowners or business elites) or other power resources (e.g., the resources to engage in violence possessed by military officers) to maintain the regime in power, whereas other groups may posit fewer such resources. Yet, due to a lack of appropriate and direct measures (see, e.g., Gallagher and Hanson 2015) on the size and identity of the coalitions that support regimes, existing empirical tests have relied on proxy variables such as competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment (from the Polity dataset). Against this background, we, first, further specify the theoretical arguments that lead us to expect that support coalition size and identity matter for autocratic regime survival. Second, we offer the first direct empirical tests of the proposed links between coalition size or support group identity, on the one hand, and autocratic regime survival, on the other. To this end, we draw on novel data from the Historical V-Dem and V-Dem v.9 datasets. Comprising several measures on the supporting groups and coalitions behind regimes, as well as precise dates on regime births and deaths, our data cover the years 1789 to the present for most polities, globally. The results from our empirical tests will be ready in April/May. We theoretically expect that support coalition identity, overall, is a more important explanatory factor for regime survival than coalition size. Next, we anticipate that support groups with concentrated wealth and vast economic assets, or, alternatively, a high capacity to organize violence, are the most conducive to long regime spells. Yet, we also expect coalition size to reduce probability of regime breakdown. In particular, we expect coalition size to mitigate regime breakdown processes due to popular uprisings.

Authors

• Sirianne Dahlum, Peace Research Institute Oslo

• Carl Henrik Knutsen, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo

• Magnus Bergli Rasmussen, University of Oslo

• Tore Wig, University of Oslo