Legislating Through Loopholes: Line-Item Vetoes in the US States

• In Event: State Executives

Abstract

In some US states, governors have prerogative powers that seemingly undo legislative bargains, most notably the line-item veto. This tool influences not only political outcomes in those states but also affects the process by which legislators craft policy in the first instance. Why do legislators commit to bargains within the legislature, if the governor can unravel those deals? I argue that legislators bargain over their policy and electoral interests in the face of looming gubernatorial action and that this induces legislators to commit to bargains, even when they know the governor will not maintain their agreements. Counter-intuitively, I derive and evaluate the prediction that line-item vetoes are more likely when polarization in state legislatures is low. Using data on the preferences of state legislators and gubernatorial action across the states, I find support for my arguments.

Author

• Ashley Moraguez, University of North Carolina, Asheville