Reputation for Resolve, and Civil Conflict

• In Event: The Political Economy of Internal Conflict

Abstract

There is a long-running disagreement about how political and economic factors affects a country's ability to project resolve. Specifically, what factors help or hurt a country's reputation for resolve? To provide new insight into these questions, I directly estimate a state's reputation for resolve by fitting a dynamic game of reputation building to civil conflict data. I find that that strong economies lead to more resolved rebels, while making governments appear less resolved. Overall, this seems to reflect the competing effects economically advanced countries are seen as more likely to buy-off potential insurgents. Additionally, I find that while governments tend to have stronger reputations for resolve than the rebels they face, democracies are seen as much less likely to be resolved both prior to and during conflict than their autocratic counterparts. As such, these findings provide new evidence for a democratic disadvantage in civil conflict.

Author

• Casey Crisman-Cox, Texas A&M University