Parties, Politics, and the Provision of Security

• In Event: The Politics of Policing and Security

Abstract

The literature on clientelism tends to focus on the exchange of material goods or services, such as cash payouts or subsidized healthcare and education, for votes. Protection has long been conceptualized as an aspect of this quid-pro-quo relationship between patrons and clients. The provision of security, however, remains an understudied but crucial “good” that some parties offer their constituents, particularly in divided societies where the state has under-performed in its role as security guarantor. What explains the variation in the provision of security and local policing by clientelistic political parties? Why do some clientelistic political parties provide security and policing as a politically motivated good while others do not exploit this service for political gain? This paper investigates these questions by tracing security measures employed by Hizbullah and the Future Movement in the country of Lebanon using GIS and semi-structured interview data. It argues that political parties are more likely to mobilize security as a discretionary service for political purposes when they are both willing to contest the state and have a centralized, hierarchical organizational structure. These two factors enable the clientelization of protection because security 1. requires a high degree of coordination among party members, and between the party and the local community, and 2. non-state security provision directly challenges the quintessential role of the Weberian state. Focusing on the clientelization of security, as opposed to other resources, provides new insights into the willingness and motivations of political parties to engage in clientelistic activity, and illuminates new aspects of the relationship between these parties and the state.

Author

• Kelly Stedem, Brandeis University