Strategic Information Manipulation: A Unified Framework

• In Event: Authoritarian Politics

Abstract

Information can be manipulated in multiple ways. To understand how strategic actors would choose to manipulate information when they have multiple options, we develop a unified model that integrates the Bayesian persuasion and the `cheap-talk' approaches. In our two-stage model, the principal has an option to cheat ex ante (manipulate how information is generated) and an option to lie ex post (manipulate the content of the generated information). The principal lies only in a restrictive set of conditions and always cheats on the equilibrium path, even if cheating is conspicuous whereas lying is not. Moreover, the principal's option to lie negatively affects the principal's welfare, but has no effect on the agent's welfare. These results indicate that the Bayesian persuasion model is remarkably robust to deviations from the commitment assumption.

Authors

• Arturas Rozenas, New York University

• Zhaotian Luo, University of Chicago