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Do nuclear weapons influence autocratic durability? International relations scholarship has recently experienced a renaissance in work devoted to the disaggregation of domestic political determinants. In particular, significant attention has been paid to the varieties and idiosyncrasies of autocratic rule. Using a mixed-methods research design, I propose to study the impact of nuclear weapons programs on autocratic resilience in office, examining the ways these and other prestige weapons can impact regime spells and leader survival. Nuclear weapons are unique symbols of national prestige: they offer a safeguard against external intervention and are coup-proofed in such a way that minimizes their likelihood of use in domestic power struggles. I argue that their pursuit can provide popular support to the leaders who champion them, while their acquisition can protect the regime from external interventions. I test these hypotheses using a combination of Bayesian survival analysis and a qualitative typological classification of the known cases of nuclear pursuit or acquisition.