Elite Polarization and Pro-Regime Militia Formation in Civil Wars

• In Event: Poster Session: International Political Economy II & Conflict Processes I
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Conflict Processes I

Abstract

This paper presents a game-theoretic examination of the decision regime-aligned elites face when choosing if and how to support the regime, and is motivated by examples of elite mobilization during the Syrian Civil War. In particular, this exploration focuses on the decision to form militias rather than provide direct support to the regime’s centralized coercive apparatus. Rather than the formation of pro-regime militias being viewed as expressions of the intensity of support for the regime, I argue that the formation of pro-regime militias is an indication of intra-elite polarization within the regime. While polarization may lead to independent mobilization by elites, such decentralized mobilization inhibits the ability of intra-regime competitors from pushing regime policy too far in their own direction. As such, regime polarization and independent elite mobilization may help protect the regime from internal threats during periods of heightened fragility. Nevertheless, the formation of independent militias carries with it the implicit threat of being mobilized against the regime or other elements of the regime. While intra-elite polarization may lead to a more fractured pro-regime coercive apparatus, under certain conditions, the regime will prefer to reduce the costs of independent mobilization in order to balance power among competing elites.

Author

• Ammar Shamaileh, Franklin & Marshall College