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Civil wars ending with negotiated peace settlements are more common now. Thus, post-civil war elections are the desideratum of the peace settlements. But, what determines the timing of the post-civil war elections? International actors are accepted as an important determinant of election timing. Seeing democracy as a panacea for a potential conflict-recurrence, international actors, particularly democratic states, usually aim to promote and hold early elections. Besides, elections are also seen as identifiable 'exit strategy' for their international involvement. Previous studies found that UN peacekeepers decrease the time required to design the post-conflict elections. However, there is still variation in when elections are held and how successful they are in promoting stability. Why? I argue that donor countries differ in their motivation to contribute peacekeepers. While developed countries contribute to generate a public good, developing countries contribute for profit. Since the profit they make depends on the length of the peacekeeping mission, early elections are not desirable for them. A duration analysis over 38 negotiated peace settlements accompanied by UN peacekeepers finds that for UN interventions to promote an earlier election, the peacekeeping troops need to be dominated by advanced democracies. Troops dominated by developing nations, on the other hand, tend to extend the length of the peacekeeping missions.