Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Personal Schedule
Sign In
X (Twitter)
In recent years, a number of highly globalized countries have experienced electoral victories for anti-globalization candidates and parties. While there have been some documented shifts in citizen views on globalization, we argue that voter turnout is critical to explaining these electoral events. Conventional wisdom and previous research argues that globalization constrains governments’ possible actions and, thus, reduces all citizens’ incentives to vote. However, other research claims that individuals with negative views of globalization vote at relatively higher rates. We posit that understanding globalization’s effects on political participation must necessarily take into account both globalization’s distributional effects on individuals as well as the broader societal context of how individuals believe their fellow-citizens view the distributional impacts of globalization. Specifically, we argue that the intrinsic value of voting is higher for those who believe that most citizens think the effects of globalization are similar to those that they themselves are experiencing. Winners (losers) from globalization who believe that the average American thinks globalization is a positive (negative) force are more likely to vote. In contrast, those who believe that they hold a minority view are less likely to feel that the impact of globalization on them personally is necessarily an indication of appropriate policy or political action. This dissonance correspondingly decreases their incentives to vote.
We examine respondents’ intentions to vote using both original and pre-existing surveys in the United States. Our original surveys include a pilot M-Turk sample and then a replication in a Qualtrics nationally representative online survey (N=1500). Participants expressed their (pre-existing, unprimed) view of the welfare impacts of globalization on them personally as well as their views of the majority opinion about globalization. Surprisingly, those negatively affected by globalization vote significantly less than those who believe it positively impacts themselves and their families. However, the interaction of the personal effect and belief is also statistically significant. Losers who think most Americans hold a negative view are more likely to vote than those who believe the majority favors globalization. Winners who think most Americans hold a negative view are less likely to vote than those who believe the majority favors globalization. In support of our hypothesis, respondent beliefs about majority opinion significantly reduce the gap between winners and losers in intention to vote. We confirm this pattern in an analysis using an objective measure of state-level trade effects (Trade Adjustment Assistance applications/jobs) as a proxy for individuals’ beliefs about how others view globalization. Our findings are also robust to using a measure about sociotropic views of globalization in place of the measure of the majority’s belief. We conduct this test because sociotropic views of globalization (which have repeatedly been shown to be distinct from views about the effects of trade on oneself) are correlated with beliefs about how other Americans view globalization. Assessment of data on egotropic and sociotropic views of trade from a 2016 PEW survey further confirms the robustness of our findings.