Doomed by Ambition? The Future of the CWC

• In Event: Arms Control

Abstract

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was agreed and entered into force during the 1990s, when post-Cold War cooperation was in its heyday. It has been consistently lauded as a landmark of arms control because it entails the elimination of an entire class of weapons that is verified by an intrusive on-site system. The Convention has many successes that it can point to-- membership in the CWC approaches universality, progress has been made on national implementation, and the destruction of declared state stockpiles nears completion--as recognised by the Nobel Peace Prize received by the the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2013.

There have been different visions of the CWC’s future ‘post-disarmament’, some envisioning a focus on the promotion of trade and technological transfer and others envisioning a focus on chemical security. Changes in science and technology (the development of non-lethal weapons) has often been seen as its biggest future hurdle.

Today, however, the CWC faces a set of unforeseen problems arising from the use of chemical agents by different kinds of actors in various contexts. While chemical weapons have not been used in interstate war since 1997, when the CWC came into force, there has been use by states of ‘non-lethal’ chemical agents in police operations, use by states of chemical agents in civil war and for assassination, and use by non state actors in civil war and terrorist attacks.

These cases emphasise the difficulties that the CWC faces in achieving its aim of the total elimination of chemical weapons. These include its limited ability to investigate allegations of use if the accused party does not cooperate, its indirect authority to address non-state actor use (since its relationship with non-state actors is mediated by the state parties), and the widespread and unavoidable availability of toxic chemicals.

So far in response to these problems we have seen ad hoc investigation and attribution mechanisms; a breakdown in the consensus process for decision making at the Executive Council; politicization of disputes within in the organisation and in the wider international context; cyber attacks on the OPCW; and denouncement of the impartiality of the OPCW by some member states.

This project analyses these issues and determines that the CWC faces a significant challenge to its viability as a universally accepted regime; indeed, we suggest that these issues contain the seeds of its potential unravelling. We can envision different responses to these issues, that would entail different possible futures--these include a growth in strength with new powers and activities, continued existence on paper with less real-world significance, or an unravelling as member states start to withdraw.

Using primary and secondary documents and interviews, the paper considers these various alternative futures and assesses their likelihood based on the treaty text, the activities of the OPCW and developments at the review conferences, and current state policies.

We conclude that in a world with re-emerging state rivalries as well as continued civil war and terrorist activity, the CWC may be doomed by the very ambition for which it was lauded at the outset: its aim to completely and irreversible rid the world of chemical weapons.

Authors

• Susan B. Martin, King's College London

• Geoffrey A. Chapman, King's College London