How Electoral Cycles Shape the Implementation of Public Programs

• In Event: Democracy, Political Networks and Distributive Politics in India

Abstract

This study sheds new light on the welfare implications of electoral cycles by examining how election timing shapes the implementation of public works programs. Using data from a program in India that provides a fixed allotment to MPs to undertake public works projects in their constituencies, the analyses show that pre-election periods exhibited a significant increase - relative to other periods - in the proportion of funds allocated to projects that ultimately did not get completed. Further analyses cast doubt on the possibility that the results are driven by strained bureaucratic capacity, increased corruption or delays resulting from the manipulations of opposition parties. Instead, the results appear to be driven by incumbent turnover produced by the election as well as by the propensity of incumbents to propose a greater proportion of unqualified projects in pre-election periods. These results shed light on important mechanisms through which democratic elections undermine public service delivery.

Authors

• Anjali Thomas, Georgia Institute of Technology

• Jonathan Parker Darsey, Georgia Institute of Technology--Sam Nunn School of International Affairs