Evolution of Electoral Competition on the Left-Right Dimension

• In Event: Diversity, Immigration, and Redistribution

Abstract

Why is the left-right (L-R) dimension not as politically salient in developing countries as opposed to more developed countries? To address this question, I develop a model of electoral competition in which two policy-motivated parties compete against each other to set policy on the L-R dimension. I show that in developing democracies, party differentiation on a left-right scale is not electorally feasible in equilibrium, given the skewed and concentrated income distribution of the electorate. As a result, policy positions are less distinguishable and generally biased towards the left. Consequently, ceteris paribus, voters use other political characteristics of parties, independent of their positions on the L-R dimension, to make their voting choices. Due to a change in the income distribution, through the process of economic development, equilibrium party positions on the L-R dimension become more polarized. Incorporating ethnic mobilization into the model, I find that the right party is more likely to use such strategies. Polarization on the ethnic dimension is non-monotonically linked to development, while polarization on the L-R dimension is monotonically increasing. This suggests that ethnic mobilization remains an important political tool in middle income countries, even as the L-R dimension becomes more important in the eyes of the voters.

Author

• Zuheir Desai