Media Control by Incumbents and Democratic Erosion

• In Event: Democratic Erosion

Abstract

Media control and repression by incumbents play an important role in democratic erosion. Most works on media repression focus on incumbents’ incentives to prevent retrospective punishment and accountability, especially for corruption. In this paper I focus on an alternative mechanism: Incumbents also want their prospective economic promises to be appealing and loyal media can help them. At the same time, the credibility of loyal media would be questioned when repression is extensive. I analyze this trade-off with a costless signalling model and argue that incumbents do not have an incentive to limit media freedoms when they have a centrist position and small gains from office or when they have a lot to gain from office. I test these hypotheses with cross-sectional time series analysis that brings together data from Polity IV (alternatively Freedom House), V-Dem, surveys from different regions that measure the median voter’s ideological position and socio-economic indicators. Initial findings support the game theoretic model’s expecation that depending on their ideological position and gains from office, incumbents would be able to credibly reveal information to increase their electoral support and hence choose to repress the media.

Author

• Ozge Kemahlioglu, Sabanci University