Overpowering Populism: A Study of Colombia and Ecuador

• In Event: The Roots of Populism in Global Perspective

Abstract

Populist leaders, in their quest to consolidate hegemonic authority, dislike sharing power. Thus, when forced to leave office, they tend to choose weak disciples to replace them. Some of these anointed successors—such as Daniel Scioli (chosen by Cristina Kirchner) in Argentina and Fernando Haddad (chosen by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) in Brazil—fail to win elections. Others—such as Isabel Perón (chosen by her husband Juan Perón) in Argentina and Nicolás Maduro (chosen by Hugo Chávez) in Venezuela—rise to power but fail to govern effectively, as they are selected for their loyalty and inherit their predecessors’ bold and shortsighted policies.

However, in Colombia and Ecuador, anointed successors have become surprisingly successful leaders. In Colombia, Alvaro Uribe´s (2002-2010) handpicked successor, Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018), achieved an approval rating above fifty percent during his first several years in office, won reelection in 2014, and negotiated an unprecedented peace deal with the FARC that earned him a Nobel Peace Prize in 2016. Similarly, in Ecuador, Rafael Correa’s (2007-2017) protégé, Lenín Moreno (2017-present), has successfully introduced important institutional reforms and has earned an approval rating as high as 77 percent since coming to power. What explains the surprising strength and effectiveness of these anointed successors?

We argue that the answer lies in these leaders’ willingness and ability to defy their populist predecessors and embrace a strategy of re-democratization. For this process to occur, independent institutions and/or opposition forces must initiate efforts to check the executive before the populist predecessor leaves office. Then, upon coming to power, the anointed successor must allow this effort to continue. In doing so, the successor can (1) limit the power of the predecessor without directly attacking his/her beloved legacy, and (2) signal a willingness to compromise and therefore gain the support of important opposition voters and legislators. Together, these steps allow the anointed successor to establish a base of support that incorporates both followers and detractors of the predecessor, which depolarizes society and enables the successor to declare independence from the populist hegemon.

To substantiate this theory, we trace the process through which Santos and Moreno became successful leaders. In particular, we demonstrate how they were able to step out of the shadow of their populist predecessors to establish independent authority. Subsequently, we use surveys to demonstrate at the micro-level how this process caused each successor to expand his support base and depolarize society. The results suggest an important mechanism through which countries can reverse populist threats and strengthen democracy. Specifically, anointed successors who facilitate the opposition’s efforts to reintroduce checks on executive power, reestablish the rule of law, and depolarize society have the potential to weaken the pernicious grasp of populism.

Authors

• Caitlin Andrews-Lee, Tulane University

• Laura Gamboa-Gutierrez, Utah State University