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What effect does uncertainty over the strength of local political institutions have on armed intervention outcomes and armed intervention strategy? While traditional theories of uncertainty and conflict tend to focus on uncertainty over capabilities, resolve, or other factors, I argue that uncertainty over local institutions and local contexts is crucial to understanding many seemingly puzzling decisions over armed intervention. In this paper, I theorize about the conditions through which uncertainty over local institutions and local contexts can impact armed intervention decisions and outcomes, specifically highlighting how interveners can often end up in lengthy foreign rule missions they did not intend to engage in prior to the initial intervention. Specifically, I examine how military organizational preferences, incentives from local proxies, and geographic distance combine to enhance uncertainty over local territories and contribute to costly armed interventions that appear rationally inefficient. Overall, this paper highlights the inherent problems of planning for prospective armed intervention, and re-evaluates the utility of armed intervention in the face of uncertainty over local contexts.