Subversion by Stealth: Dynamics of Democratic Backsliding

• In Event: The Political Economy of Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

The dream of all politicians is to remain for ever in office and to use it to do whatever they want. Most democratic governments attempt to advance these goals by building popular support within the established institutional framework. Some, however, seek to protect their tenure in office and to remove obstacles to their discretion in choosing policies by undermining institutions and disabling all opposition. The striking lesson of the successful cases of backsliding is that governments need not take unconstitutional or undemocratic steps to secure complete domination. The effect of what we call "stealth" is that if the opposition does not stop the government from taking some series of legal steps, it will be eventually unable to prevent it from taking illegal ones. We investigate whether a government will take anti-democratic steps, whether it can be stopped short of realization of its complete domination, and whether it is likely to be removed at any stage of the process. We first present our understanding of this process in purely verbal terms and only then provide a model that justifies it.

Authors

• Zhaotian Luo, University of Chicago

• Adam Przeworski, New York University