The Psychology of Intervention

• In Event: Leaders and Foreign Policy

Abstract

A growing body of literature suggests that overt interventions by foreign powers are fraught with various kinds of liabilities. States who overtly meddle abroad risk setting off escalatory spirals, incurring the public’s wrath, inciting a nationalist backlash in the target state, and damaging their credibility and legitimacy abroad. In some cases, leaders opt for overt action despite such risks as a way to increase the chances that a mission will succeed. In other cases, leaders choose covert action to mitigate the risks of open interference even when the constraints of secret intervention lower the chances of mission success. What accounts for this variation? Drawing on prospect theory and loss aversion, this paper argues that leaders’ appetite for risk—defined in terms of cost tolerance—differs depending on whether the goal is to overthrow a foreign regime or to prop one up. Because regime change constitutes a prospective gain, leaders are more likely to opt for covert action, even if it means they are more likely to fail, unless the risks of overt intervention are sufficiently low. Conversely, because regime rescue approximates loss prevention, leaders are more likely to intervene covertly if it is likely to work but will opt for overt intervention otherwise. I test this theory on four cases of U.S. intervention, one for each of the four potential outcomes: covert action in Chile in 1970 (regime change, high risk), overt action in Panama in 1989 (regime change, low risk), covert action in Jordan in 1970 (regime rescue, high risk), and overt action in Kuwait in 1991 (regime rescue, low risk).

Author

• Michael Poznansky, University of Pittsburgh