Unity within Diversity – Pachakutik’s Mobilization Strategies in Local Elections

• In Event: Poster Session: Political Organizations and Parties & Elections and Voting Behavior
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Political Parties and Interest Groups

Abstract

Ethnic parties are often associated with particularistic appeals. The common definition of ethnic parties is limited by the unavoidable link of these parties with clientelistic practices and the assumption that ethnic parties (and political parties in general) employ only one mobilization strategy to influence their voters. Notwithstanding these definitions, researchers of ethnic politics have found that ethnic parties do employ different forms of mobilization strategies that include, but are not limited to, clientelistic appeals (Elliott, 2011; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Madrid, 2012; Resnick, 2014; Thachil, 2014). This corresponds with findings about ethnic voting and the role of ethnicity for voters’ preference formation (Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Nathan, 2016; Posner, 2005). Namely, that the role of ethnicity on voting behavior has shifted from being the essential element of voters’ preference formation, into an information shortcut that helps voters identify who will get what when a party is elected. Yet, our knowledge about ethnic party-voter mobilization strategies is still scarce. We know little about how ethnic parties might aim to convey information about which groups will receive what, and the kind of goods, e.g. club goods or universalistic goods, an electoral district will receive if one candidate or party is elected over another.
The answer seems to be that ethnic parties employ a combination of strategies to influence their voters. This is an understudied topic. Mostly because the commonly employed analytical framework of party-voter mobilization strategies states that the costs of combining mobilization strategies are higher than the possible electoral revenues (Kitschelt, 2000). However, extant research has found that parties do combine and segment their strategies. Thus far, nevertheless, our cumulative knowledge has been hindered because most cases of segmented appeals are considered as one-of cases and authors make use of different categories to analyze them. This paper addresses this gap in our knowledge and develops a party-voter mobilization strategy typology based on Thomas Mustillo’s (2016) work and discusses an analytical framework of how parties can segment strategies i.e. use different strategies to mobilize different constituencies, and mix strategies i.e. combine two or more strategies to mobilize a single constituency.
The typology suggests parties can employ: programmatic, symbolic, clientelistic, and vote-buying mobilization strategies to influence their voters. The framework discusses the effects of spatial and nonspatial characteristics of electoral districts and how they can determine the kind of strategies ethnic parties employ. Parties are more likely to mix programmatic and symbolic linkages, or clientelistic and symbolic linkages, than they are of mixing programmatic and clientelistic or vote buying linkages. Moreover, as the argument about segmented electoral appeals relies on the idea of parties mobilizing core and non-core voters, the analytical framework focuses on the effects of context for parties' choices. In particular, how homogenous or heterogeneous electoral districts are, and how well interconnected the districts are i.e. whether the districts interact with each other, are part of the same media market, or if interest networks work across districts. Within districts, parties will segment their appeals when districts are geographically and socioeconomically fragmented. In homogenous districts, or highly interconnected districts, parties are less likely to segment their mobilization strategies. Across districts, parties are more likely to segment their appeals when districts are geographically distant and have little interaction with each other. By contrast, in districts that are highly interconnected parties are less likely to segment their mobilization strategies.
I apply this framework to the Ecuadorian ethnic party Pachakutik and its strategy at the 2014 local elections. The party successfully mobilizes non-ethnic voters support, winning elections in districts where indigenous population is scarce. It has been argued that the party employs ethno-populism appeals (Madrid, 2012). I find that the party segments its strategies and mixes strategies following the expectations of the analytical framework. In particular, the party emphasizes its ethnic/symbolic mobilization strategies only in districts where the indigenous population is a majority, or where neighboring districts have already supported an ethnic candidate. The party makes use of the interaction between electoral districts to influence its voters, namely the contagion-effect of having a successful candidate in a neighboring district and emphasizing the work of the elected party member. By contrast, in districts where the indigenous population is scarce the party employs programmatic appeals and de-emphasizes its symbolic appeals.

Author

• Diana Davila Gordillo, Leiden University