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In the study of authoritarian regimes’ international commitments, the African Union’s provisions against unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) constitute a paradox: on the one hand, non-democratic governments dominate the political landscape in Africa. On the other hand, the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance enshrined a strong democratic quality in these UCG norms, thus moving beyond their initial focus on regime stability. Based on descriptive statistical analysis and fieldwork in Ethiopia, this paper investigates why authoritarian regimes that violate democratic principles through, for instance, rigged elections, subscribe to the Democracy Charter. We find a clear, but not linear ratification pattern: half of Africa’s electoral autocracies and almost all electoral democracies have ratified the Charter, while closed autocracies such as Somalia or Eritrea eschew the minimal continental consensus. The ratifiers signal a discursive commitment to democracy, but self-serving regime-security interests prevail. Electoral autocracies have ensured that democratic commitments, particularly for sitting presidents, are only selectively implemented. Yet, the 2017 case of The Gambia, where President Jammeh was forced out of power after losing the presidential election, indicates that autocrats may underestimate the progressive potential of continental democracy provisions.