Overvaluing Deterrence in Counterterrorism

• In Event: Formal Models of International Politics

Abstract

Many governments have made the deterrence of terrorist activities one of their top priorities. While preventing the occurrence of terrorist attacks is an important objective, defeating terrorist groups once for all should remain the ultimate goal of governments involved in the fight against terror. Using a game-theoretic model of the interaction between a government and a terrorist group, I assess the strategic consequences that deterring terrorism has on the long-term success against violent groups. Successful deterrence would imply a complete lack of action on the side of the terrorists. While this would guarantee perfect security in the short-run, it would prevent security agencies from capturing operatives and accessing useful information to accelerate the demise of the terrorist organization. Such a "shut-out" strategy could be successful only if the terrorist organization is weak enough, in that it relies on terrorist acts to attract support and financing, while it would be suboptimal when facing a more resilient group. After identifying this trade-off, I assess how various political institutions interact with it and how this interaction affects the dynamics of terrorism prevention.

Author

• Livio Di Lonardo, Bocconi University