Legislative Bench-Marking: A Theory of Accountability and Roll-Call Voting

• In Event: Formal Theory and the Judicial System

Abstract

Most accountability models of politics focus on an executive; rarely do they contain features distinctive of legislative decision-making. Here we focus on one such feature: the ability of voters to assess the competence and preferences of their representative by comparing roll call votes across law makers with their own perceptions of correct voting (legislative bench-marking). In turn, legislative bench-marking creates an incentive for lawmakers to engage in unanimous votes despite possible reservations about the instant policy. We formalize these notions by combining an adverse selection/moral hazard game between citizens and representatives with a global game between members of the legislature (more specifically, a Keynesian Beauty Contest). To make matter concrete, we focus throughout on voting on Supreme Court nominations, examining the forces incentivizing unanimous or near-unanimous yea votes prior to the 1990s, and how they broke down, leading to highly partisan votes today.

Authors

• Charles M. Cameron, Princeton University

• John P. Kastellec, Princeton University