Customary Institutional Strength and Civilian Victimization in Armed Conflicts

• In Event: The Politics of Customary Institutions: Comparative Data and Analysis

Abstract

How does the strength of customary institutions influence the strategic use of violence against civilians in intra-state armed conflicts? Studies on wartime governance have sparked increasing interest in the role of civilian agency and authority in shaping armed groups’ conduct in conflict. Customary institutions, such traditional authority and indigenous leadership structures, can help to maintain social cohesion and enable collective action and coordination during an armed conflict. Yet, I propose, strong customary institutions can also threaten the interests of the armed groups and therefore attract one-sided violence. Legitimate and efficient customary institutions can facilitate resistance and are harder to co-opt than weaker institutions, thus presenting potential obstacles to an armed group’s control over an area. I use geocoded Afrobarometer data to capture the strength of traditional leaders at a local level in 14 African countries and examine how this relates to acts of one-sided violence by state and non-state armed groups. The analysis indicates that areas with strong traditional leaders experience more one-sided violence than areas with weaker traditional rulers. In particular, rebel groups appear to target non-combatants in areas with strong traditional chiefs. This study suggests that while instrumental in managing communal and inter-group tensions, strong local customary institutions can paradoxically attract more violence when they stand against the interests of armed groups fighting over the future political order of the state.

Author

• Katariina Mustasilta, University of Essex