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Populism and the rage it brings against establishment identities and institutions have suddenly captured the attention of mainstream political scientists who had been deeply entrenched in an 'institutional turn.' The bulk of the political science literature that has emerged in the past three years has either dealt with populism as inherently anti-democratic or re-evaluated how secure democracy is in what he previously been thought to be mature democracies. Even while periodically admitting that some felt 'left out' and there were 'economic reasons’ for grievances, political science scholarship overwhelmingly focused on populism as a threat to democracy.
This is because populism challenges the liberal and constitutional roots of modern democracy and nowhere is this more evident than in the way that pro-populist forces think about institutions. While most scholars recognize that populist frustration with institutions is largely rooted in the latter's slowing down of 'necessary' decisions because of a commitment to 'due process' (in the vein of Carl Schmitt) and all see populism as a function of frustration with an established political environment, very few have taken seriously what is populism's most serious challenge to liberal, constitutional democracy. An exploration of Venezuelan and Brazilian politics can be instructive as both have faced different degrees of polarization and institutional challenges.
In both cases, democratic demands drive anti-institutional politics and lead to outcomes that can very easily be seen as leading democracy on the path to death, as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) would have it. This may very well be the case, though it might not be as well. What is certainly true is that political leaders (in government and/or opposition) often aim to institute a different, purportedly, more democratic polity through elimination or undermining what had been previously seen as fundamental democratic institutions. Such moves trigger political scientists because there is a widely-shared assumption that institutions are reformable but nonetheless permanent. Populists historicize institutions to a far greater extent and are more willing to see that an institution 'no longer serves its purpose' or is 'so corrupt' that it now marginalizes rather than includes. Such positions are not uncommon for political outsiders. What is relatively novel in recent populism is that when some leaders enter power they seek not only to replace establishment institutions where the ancien regime can resist but they build many institutions without seeing these as necessarily more permanent. In this way, such populists understand institutionality--the encounter of institutions, modes of popular representation, and administrative decision-- with a very different analytical and normative appreciation of time. Institutionalization, as the reduction of uncertainty through the gradual routinization of behavior through designated channels, is no longer the normative goal of a political system but is only one tool and, in the view of these populists, is a very unlikely tool to generate an authentic form of democracy. This paper argues that many radical populist claims and actions display an institutionality that is alternative and antithetical to the understanding of institutionalization which is a core, but under-recognized, component of liberal, constitutional democracy. This paper does not defend the visions of such actors but it argues that understanding the position of these actors is important for political science for analytical and normative reasons
Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing.
Ostiguy, Pierre and Kenneth Roberts. 2016. “Putting Trump in Comparative Perspective: Populism and the Politicization of the Sociocultural Low,” Brown Journal of World Affairs Fall/Winter, Vol XXIII (1), p.31-50