Populism and Public Administration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

• In Event: Populism, Institutions and Institutionalization

Abstract

Both Brazil and the United States have over the past several years elected right-wing populist presidents. Both President Bolsonaro and President Trump have expressed some disdain for the public bureaucracy in their countries and have embarked on programs altering many public policies. Some of those policy changes have sought to weaken civil liberties, and to undermine popular social and economic programs. Although the two countries have elected not dissimilar chief executives, they vary in terms of the degree of institutionalization of democracy, and the strength of their civil service systems.
How will civil servants react to these policy changes, especially given that they may have to administer the changes? Using the familiar triad of “working, shirking and sabotage” (Brehm and Gates, 1999). We have been conducting a survey experiment in the two countries giving respondents (all public employees of some sort) vignettes about policy changes and asking about their willingness to shirk, or even to attempt to sabotage, the programs. The (very) preliminary results indicates varying degrees of willingness to deviate from the expected behaviors of civil servants, based on a number of factors .
This paper will explore the differences between the two countries, as well as differences from respondents from different levels of government and different levels of experience in the public sector. The results will provide valuable insights into the effects of populist politics on the behavior of members of one important institution in the public sector.

Authors

• B. Guy Peters, University of Pittsburgh

• João Victor Guedes-Neto, University of Pittsburgh